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Abstract
This paper provides new evidence on the long-run relationship between economic growth and labor’s share in national 
income, based on a comprehensive panel data set for 123 countries from 1950 to 2004. Xie’s primary finding is 
that labor’s share follows a cubic relationship with real GDP per capita over the long process of development. At the 
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threshold is reached. After that, labor’s share keeps increasing until the country’s GDP per capita reaches a second 
threshold before falling again. Xie argues that these dynamics apply not only to the less developed countries in the 
postwar years, but also to the advanced countries like the United States and the United Kingdom during their early 
economic take-offs, starting in the late 18th and 19th century, respectively. Finally, he proposes a two-sector constant 
elasticity of substitution (CES)-type growth model and simulates the model to replicate and explain the possible 
mechanism behind such a nonlinear pattern of movements in labor’s share.
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1 IntroductIon
One of the most important empirics upon which the modern growth theory is built (Solow 1957) is that 
the labor and capital shares in national income are roughly constant over time. As one of his six stylized 
facts, Kaldor (1957) summarized it as, “It was known for some time that the share of wages and the share 
of profits in the national income has shown a remarkable constancy in ‘developed’ capitalist economies 
of the United States and the United Kingdom since the second half of the 19th century.” This echoes 
Keynes’ surprise (1939), “I mean the stability of the proportion of the national dividend accruing to 
labor, irrespective apparently of the level of output as a whole and of the phase of the trade cycle. This is 
one of the most surprising, yet best-established, facts in the whole range of economic statistics, both for 
Great Britain and for the United States… It is the stability of the ratio for each country which is chiefly 
remarkable, and this appears to be a long-run, and not merely a short-period, phenomenon.” On the 
other hand, Kuznets (1959) challenges the view of constancy of factor shares cross country or over time. 
Most recently, there has been a small literature trying to reconcile the Kaldor fact with structural transfor-
mation, for example, Kongsamut, Rebelo, and Xie (2001); Ngai and Pissarides (2007); and Acemoglu and 
Guerrieri (2008).
In this paper, I will provide new empirical evidence on the long-run relationship between economic 
growth and labor’s share in national income. I construct a comprehensive panel data set of labor’s share for 
123 countries from 1950 to 2004 (most countries in this data set have data available from 1970 to 2004). 
My primary finding is that labor’s share tracks a cubic relationship with real GDP per capita over the long 
process of development. At the beginning of the economic take-off, the share of labor in national income 
will first decrease until a threshold of US$3,000 is reached (denominated in 2000 constant US dollars). 
With empirical support from the latest research in economic history, I would also argue that this pattern 
applies not only to the less developed countries since 1950, but also to the advanced countries like the 
United States and the United Kingdom in their earliest stages of development. After this first threshold 
is passed, labor’s share will keep increasing until the country’s real GDP per capita reaches the next 
threshold, around US$15,000. After that, labor’s share will follow a downward trend again. To explore the 
mechanism behind such nonlinear and non-monotonous movements in the labor’s share, I build a growth 
model based on a two-sector constant elasticity of substitution (CES) production function and consumer 
preference specification, following Engel’s law. In short, my findings can be seen as a generalization of the 
Kaldor fact and Solow-type growth model, to characterize the panoramic process of modern economic growth.
The emphasis on structural transformation can be traced back to Simon Kuznets, who summarizes 
the main quantitative characteristics of modern economic growth in his Nobel Prize lecture (Kuznets 
1973), “…the rate of structural transformation of the economy is high. Major aspects of structural change 
include the shift away from agriculture to nonagricultural pursuits and, recently, away from industry 3
to services; a change in the scale of productive units, and a related shift from personal enterprise to 
impersonal organization of economic firms, with a corresponding change in the occupational status of 
labor.” Kuznets identifies two grand transformations. The first is industrialization, during which economic 
resources are transferred from the agricultural or feudal sector to the industrial sector. However, the 
timing of industrialization varies tremendously among countries. The Industrial Revolution in Great 
Britain, the first industrialization in human history, started from the end of the 18th century, while 
some emerging economies like China are experiencing a similar process two centuries later. The second 
transformation is from industry to services. Beyond Kuznets, I will provide new evidence and ascribe the 
second decline of labor’s share in my empirical findings to a possible ongoing third economic transformation, the 
rise of the finance and real estate sector in the later phase of economic development.
Kuznets (1955) was among the first researchers to deal with the inequality problem in early 
economic development, as summarized by the classical “Kuznets Curve.” As the size of agriculture 
shrinks, the size of industry grows, and inequality increases due to the large gap between the two sectors. 
In a classical framework, Lewis (1954) assumes the real wage is fixed in terms of agricultural goods and 
that there will be disguised unemployment before it can be consumed by the industrial sector. With 
Lewis’ oversimplified model, it is very easy to explain why labor’s share will go down at the beginning of 
industrialization: because of the surplus labor and stagnation of the wage. In contrast, Jorgenson (1961, 
1967) and Ranis and Fei (1961) successfully applied a neoclassical approach to modeling the transitional 
process.
In the recent literature, Blanchard (1997, 1998), Caballero and Hammour (1998), Rodrik (1999), 
Acemoglu (2003), Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003), and Bentolila and Saint-Paul (2003) have explored 
various factors behind the movements of labor’s share, mainly focusing on the OECD countries in the 
postwar period. Young (2006) uses postwar US data to challenge the relatively constancy of aggregate 
factor shares, following the methodology of Solow (1958). Ruiz (2005) provides empirical evidence on 
the nonconstancy in factor shares for Spain using its time series data from 1955 to 2005. In contrast, 
my research emphasizes the movements of labor’s share in long-run economic development and 
transformation, with the least developed countries included. On the other hand, Gollin (2002) and 
Bernanke and Gurkaynak (2001) design delicate methodologies to adjust labor’s share for the developing 
countries. With their adjustment for the noncorporate sector in developing countries, labor’s share is 
pulled closer to the level of the developed world. However, they limit their exploration to cross-country 
comparisons and do not take into consideration the possibility of nonlinear dynamics in different stages 
of development.
The seminal paper by Arrow et al. (1961) proposed the CES production function with empirical 
support. Leontief (1964) also criticized the Cobb-Douglas function, “…whenever a working economist 4
was called on to describe in numbers or to interpret in analytical terms the relationship between the 
inputs of capital and labor and the final product of a plant, an industry, or a national economy as a whole, 
he was more likely than not to reach out for the Cobb-Douglas production function… But now this 
remarkable career is apparently coming to an end. The old formula is being rapidly replaced by a new, 
improved recipe: the constant elasticity of substitution production function…” Most recently, Duffy and 
Papageorgiou (2000) revived a literature in economic growth and adopted the CES-form production 
function. Acemoglu (2003) assumes an elasticity of substitution that is lower than one. Estimates by 
Antras (2004) for the United States suggest an elasticity lower than one, even probably below 0.5. Solow 
(2008) presents a review of this new small literature. My theoretical model is built upon a new two-sector 
CES specification.
Another literature related to my research is the Unified Growth Theory initiated by Galor and Weil 
(2000) and Hansen and Prescott (2002). This literature intends to integrate the Malthusian stagnation 
with modern economic growth in a unified framework.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents my main empirical findings characterizing 
the evolution of labor’s share during long-run development. Section 3 offers sectoral analysis of 
the movements in labor’s share and examines the empirical evidences behind the three economic 
transformations. Section 4 tries to test my empirical findings with the economic history of the United 
Kingdom and the United States. Section 5 develops a two-sector unified growth model, aiming at 
explaining the nonlinear and nonmonotonous dynamics of labor’s share. Section 6 performs a simple 
simulation based on the proposed growth model. Section 7 concludes the paper.
2 EvolutIon of lAbor’s shArE And nEw PAnEl AnAlysIs
In this section, I will present new empirical results on the movements of labor’s share in national income. 
In section 2.1 I first discuss various definitions of labor’s share and explain why I choose my own 
definition. Section 2.2 shows the main panel regression results. In section 2.3 I provide additional robust 
checks, using a variety of control variables.
2.1 various definitions of labor’s share
The simplest definition of labor’s share in national income is the ratio of compensation to the employees 
to GDP minus indirect taxes as (1), 
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  These data are generally available in the United Nations System of National Accounts.
However, according to this simple formula, some countries seem to have too low of shares of 
labor income. Gollin (2002) attributes the abnormally lower value of labor’s share in many 
developing countries to the failure of incorporating the income of the self-employed and 
noncorporate employees into the “employee compensation.” Gollin thus names specification (1) 
as a naive method and improves the measure of labor’s share by adopting several adjustments. 
One of Gollin’s well-accepted corrections is shown by (2), 
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  After this adjustment, some countries’ labor shares are boosted up significantly. 
Bernanke and Gurkaynak (2001) generally confirm Gollin’s methodology, and they especially 
prefer the estimation formula of (2). 
  The other method is to adjust the GDP data by assuming the corporate and noncorporate 
workers receive the same average earnings, as calculated by (3), 
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Bernanke and Gurkaynak (2001) also proposed the imputed operating surplus of private 
unincorporated enterprises (OSPUE) method, by (4) and (5), 
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  Admittedly, the Gollin method of adjustment can help to mitigate some of the anomalies, 
for example: Without adjustment, Niger’s labor share is calculated as about 16 percent with the 
naive method, but rises up to around 60 percent with the adjustment. However, as Bernanke and 
Gurkaynak (2001) put, there are only a few countries that have OSPUE (or mixed income) data 
available. Gollin (2002) covers only about 30 countries. Bernanke and Gurkaynak (2001) expand 
the coverage to about 50 countries. I finally gathered data for about 60 countries that have data 
available that satisfies the demands of (2). My dataset covers about 2,700 observations of 
employees’ compensation, of which only 800 observations have corresponding mixed income 
data. Moreover, taking a close look at the data, I find countries with mixed income data available 
are either developed countries or poor countries only having a few observations. 
  Moreover, according to my analysis, disparate calculating methodologies do not change 
much the relative time series trend in the movements of the labor share for a specific country. In 
table 1, I show the correlation between the naive measure (1) and sophisticated measure (2). The 
dependent variable is the “classical” definition of labor’s share by Gollin (2002). The correlation 
is high. In particular when I control the country fixed effect in column (3), I get a coefficient 
very close to 1. 
  In addition, there are some limitations for these adjustment methods. The explicit or 
implicit intention of the adjustments proposed by Gollin (2002) and followed by Bernanke and 
Gurkaynak (2001) is to narrow the analysis within the formal sector, or the modern corporated 
sector. It might be good enough for modern economic analysis, but it will mask many facts that 
are essential for studying long-run development, as emphasized by Kuznets, “the shift from 
personal enterprise to impersonal organization of economic firms” as well as the dual economy 
emphasized by Jorgenson (1961). 
  Gollin (2002) only conducts cross-country analysis, so do Bernanke and Gurkaynak 
(2001). Gollin (2002) finds some relatively poor countries like India had a labor’s share as high 
as 0.84 in 1980, and Vietnam got the same number in 1989. These numbers are even much larger 
than that of the United States and Japan. A hypothesis to reconcile these seemingly abnormal 
facts is that a country’s labor income share might firstly decrease at the beginning of economic 
development and then rise again at a later stage. Cross-country analysis in previous research 
cannot capture these interesting and crucial dynamics, especially during economic 
transformation. 
 
2.2 Primary Panel Analysis 
   
In this research, I adopt the panel method with fixed effects, so the naive measure of labor’s 
share can be good enough when the country-specific characteristics are controlled. Although 
different countries could have disparate shares of a self-employed (not incorporated) sector, 
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(2002) finds some relatively poor countries like India had a labor’s share as high as 0.84 in 1980, and 
Vietnam got the same number in 1989. These numbers are even much larger than that of the United 
States and Japan. A hypothesis to reconcile these seemingly abnormal facts is that a country’s labor income 
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2.2 Primary Panel Analysis
In this research, I adopt the panel method with fixed effects, so the naive measure of labor’s share can be 
good enough when the country-specific characteristics are controlled. Although different countries could 
have disparate shares of a self-employed (not incorporated) sector, which can be captured by the constant 
item in a fixed effect panel model, the comovement of labor’s share in the (formal) incorporated sector 
and the whole economy seems to be fairly high, as proved in table 1. The main purpose of this research is 
to explore the long-run movements of labor’s share over time, so the panel method with fixed effects is an 
appropriate choice.
My new empirical exploration is based on several major databases, including the United Nations 
System of National Accounts, the EU KLEMS Growth and Productivity Accounts, various national 
sources, as well as the latest research findings for various countries. If a country’s labor share data is 
covered by different sources, I prefer to choose the data source with the longest time series. Even if 
different countries may use disparate definitions of labor’s share, panel methodology can help to correct 7
this because I care mainly about the evolution over time within a country. For national GDP data, I use 
the Penn World Table (PWT6.2) real GDP per capita (rgdpch, chain series), i.e., international dollars in 
2000 constant prices. Labor’s share in national income follows equation (1).
The primary panel regression results are shown in table 2. Columns (1) and (2) use the yearly data 
with country fixed effects controlled. Column (1) also controls the time fixed effect of each year, whereas 
column (2) treats time as a linear variable. Columns (3) and (4) illustrate the panel regression results 
with all variables in five-year averages, as in the standard growth regression practices. In addition, I also 
try specifications of quadratic and higher power relationships with 1n(rgdpch) in columns (5) and (6), in 
which the coefficients are not statistically significant.
The basic findings in table 2 illustrate a strong cubic relationship between labor’s share and the 
level of economic development. It is reasonable to think the commodity exporters might have a different 
economic structure—very disparate sector compositions and thus “disturb” the relationship between the 
labor’s share and GDP level. Therefore, I have additionally checked this relationship by removing the 
commodity exporters, and show the new regression results in table A1. The cubic relationship is kept very 
well after removing the most important 22 commodity exporters (in terms of the commodity exports 
value to GDP ratio).
2.3 robustness checks with standard controls
In this section, I add standard control variables used in the long-run economic growth literature. All 
exercises in this subsection are panel regressions with both country and time fixed effects. The new results 
are presented in table 3. All variables are in five-year averages.
Firstly, in all the exercises the cubic relationship between the labor’s share and the per capita GDP 
level is very robustly kept. In column (1) I add the updated school year variable by Barro and Lee (2000). 
Column (2) illustrates that the average human capital level follows a reversed U-shape relationship with 
labor’s share. Investment generally increases the labor’s share with other factors controlled, although 
this relationship is not always robust. However, population growth rate, institutional quality (from 
the Polity Project, as preferred by the present growth literature), and openness do not have very strong 
statistical relationships with the labor’s share over time. Column (5) shows that inflation has a strong, 
negative correlation with labor’s share, which is consistent with research elsewhere. In table A2 I show 
the corresponding regression results with the commodity exporters removed, and no obvious changes are 
found in the value and significance of the new set of coefficients.
I can recover and characterize the explicit relationship between the labor’s share and real GDP per 
capita according to the coefficients derived from these regressions. Figure 1 exemplifies this long-term 
relationship diagrammatically. The horizontal axis lines out the per capita real GDP level. After an 8
economy just moves onto the track of modern economic growth, its labor’s share will firstly experience 
a continuous drop until the first minimum value is attained. I can solve this numerically. The first 
minimum of the labor’s share is reached at GDP level around US$3,000 in per capita terms (in 2000 
constant US dollars). After passing this first turning point, the labor’s share begins to rise monotonously 
for quite a long time with the economic growth going on. Then the second turning point, a local 
maximum is reached. I can solve and see this local maximum of labor’s share is approximately arrived at a 
per capita GDP level of US$15,000 (in 2000 US dollars). The modern economic growth theory and the 
Kaldor fact have mainly focused on the smoother portion of the curve, and this is why a constant labor’s 
share is generally assumed and agreed on. 
To depict this with real data, in figure 2 I scatter the labor’s share versus real GDP per capita with 
pooled data for four periods, 1970–74, 1980–84, 1990–94, and 2000–2004. Moreover, figures 3–6 
demonstrate all countries’ data in each period respectively along with the fitted curves.
This can also help to explain the “puzzles” encountered in the research of Gollin (2002) and 
Bernanke and Gurkaynak (2001): Why do some poor countries have such high labor’s share? The 
nonlinear and nonmonotonous movements of the labor’s share as demonstrated by figure 1 could provide 
a feasible answer. It just so happens that many least developed countries are located on the portion of 
the curve before the first turning point and are undergoing a durative reduction in labor’s share right 
now. This will be confirmed with detailed discussions on what is happening in the present China and 
India in the next section (section 3.2). At the same time, many middle-income countries have marched 
to the portion of the curve between the first local minimum and the local maximum, and so they are 
currently seeing a gradual rise in their labor’s share. This will be discussed in detail in section 3.3. Finally, 
a small number of developed countries have arrived at the third part of the curve after exceeding the 
second turning point and will endure a drop in their labor’s share again. I describe this recent stage of 
development as “financialization” and will conduct deeper analysis in section 3.4.
3 bEhInd thE vEIl of thE long-run MovEMEnts In lAbor’s shArE
I attribute the nonlinear and nonmonotonous pattern in the movements of labor’s share to the grand 
economic transformations. Some researchers like Kuznets stress the importance of production transfor-
mation, while others like Engel underline the evolution of the consumers’ preferences. Probably these 
two forces have joined together to stimulate the unremitting evolution of the national economy as well 
as labor’s share. In this section, I conduct a sectoral decomposition analysis of the change in labor’s share 
over time to prepare for later statistical explorations. I then go on to discuss the three grand economic 
transformations that have happened or are happening right now.9
3.1 A sectoral decomposition in the Evolution of labor’s share
I denote the change of aggregate labor’s share in the whole economy from t to t + 1 by DL = Lt+1 – Lt. Labor’s 
share at time t + 1 can be decomposed into sectors following (6). I assume there are K economic sectors in 
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There are four components in the decomposition equation (9): 
(1) i t i l v   , :  the pure within-sector change effect of the labor’s share, given a constant 
value-added share as in time  t
(2) t i t i l v , ,

 :  the deviation of sector  i’s labor’s share from the average level at time  t. This 
describes sector  i’s idiosyncrasy in terms of its labor income share. 
(3) : i i l v      the joint effect of the sectoral size change and within-sector labor share change 
(4) t i i l v ,

  :  the pure effect of sectoral size change given a constant labor’s share as in time  t
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. 
I use Dvi = vi,t+1 – vi,t to represent the change of value-added share of sector i rom t to t + 1. Labor’s share of 
sector i at time t + 1 is li,t+1, and li,t+1 – li,t = Dli . 
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, I can use (7) to decompose DL by sectors. From time t to t + 
1 sector i ’s additional deviation from the aggregate labor’s share at t is represented by vi,t+1.(li,t+1 –Lt), which 
is the product of the sector’s value-added share at time t + 1 and the deviation of its sectoral labor’s share 
at time t + 1 from the aggregate labor’s share of time t.
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There are four components in the decomposition equation (9): 
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There are four components in the decomposition equation (9): 
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There are four components in the decomposition equation (9):
(1) vi,t . Dli : the pure within-sector change effect of the labor’s share, given a constant value-added 
share as in time t
(2) vi,t . l i,t : the deviation of sector i ’s labor’s share from the average level at time t. This describes 
sector i ’s idiosyncrasy in terms of its labor income share.
(3) Dvi . Dli : the joint effect of the sectoral size change and within-sector labor share change
(4) Dvi . l i,t : the pure effect of sectoral size change given a constant labor’s share as in time t 
I notice 
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Therefore, the components (1)  i t i l v   , , (3)  i i l v    , and (4)  t i i l v ,

    capture the three types of 
sectoral contribution to the aggregate change in the national labor’s share from time  t  to  . 1  t
3.2 The First Grand Transformation: Industrialization 
Agriculture in many developing countries has very high labor’s share. In premodern society 
agricultural production is mainly conducted by the farmers’ hands largely without the help of 
capital-intensive equipment. After industrialization is finally completed, agriculture will become 
a capital-intensive sector with new supplies of mechanical equipment and fertilizers from the 
industrial sector, as evidenced by the experiences of OECD countries. 
  Subramanian (2008) raises concern about sluggish wage growth in China. According to 
Bai and Qian (2009), labor’s share in China’s agriculture is around 0.85 and has been relatively 
stable from 1978 to 2004. This value is much higher than that in industry and services. In the 
past 15 years, labor’s share in industry has kept decreasing whereas that in the services sector is 
relatively constant. The joint effect is a significant drop in the aggregate labor share in the 
national income in recent years, which has provoked concerns and discussions in China. This is 
consistent with the reported 4 percentage point reduction in average wage’s share from 
1995–2000 to 2001–06 by ILO (2008). Nevertheless, in light of my new empirical findings in 
section 2, the reduction in labor’s share at the present development stage seems to be 
unavoidable and the turning point should be coming very soon. Figure 7 has shown such a 
possible trend from 2003 to 2004, although I do not have the latest data to further verify this 
hypothesis.
  Shastri and Murthy (2005) provide a similar pattern in a considerable drop of wage’s 
share in organized Indian industry between 1973 and 1997. During this period, labor’s share in 
the organized Indian industry decreased by 19 percent, falling from 51.7 percent to 32.8 percent, 
as shown in figure 8. RUPE (2008) points out that National Sample Survey (NSS) of 2004–05 
shows a decline in real wages for urban workers (male and female, regular salaried and casual) 
over the NSS (1999–2000). Wage levels of workers are declining not only in the unorganized 
sector but also in the organized sector. Simultaneously the share of profit in value added in the 
organized sector is found to be rising. This echoes a report from the National Commission on 
Enterprises in the Unorganized Sector (NCEUS 2007). The wage share in my organized 
industrial sector has halved after the 1980s. Although ILO (2008) does not provide India’s 
wage’s share data, the average real wage growth rates for the periods 1995–2000 and 2001–07 
are reported to be 1 percent and 1.6 percent respectively, significantly lower than the real GDP 
growth rates. I plot in figure 9 the labor’s share of the Indian economy since 1980, which 
confirms such a declining trend. 
3.3 The Second Grand Transformation: Toward the Postindustrial Society 
Following the industrialization process, modern services begin to expand simultaneously. 
Furthermore, at a later stage, the share of the services sector will continue to expand at the 
expense of industry. This procedure is sometimes called deindustrialization. Labor’s share will 
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3.3 the second grand transformation: toward the Postindustrial society
Following the industrialization process, modern services begin to expand simultaneously. Furthermore, 
at a later stage, the share of the services sector will continue to expand at the expense of industry. This 
procedure is sometimes called deindustrialization. Labor’s share will keep increasing in this process.
Ruiz (2005) presents a detailed analysis for both Spain and the United States from 1955 to 2005 
regarding their sectoral value-added size, within-sector labor’s share, and aggregate labor’s share in the 
national economy. Figure 10 illustrates the evolution of the labor’s share relative to GDP per capita for 
Spain. In 1955, real GDP per capita in Spain was higher than US$4,000, past my first turning point of 
US$3,000 derived in section 2. So I think Spain from 1955 to 2005 is a good example to showcase the 
later stage of industrialization as well as deindustrialization. The Spanish aggregate labor’s share has kept 
increasing from 1955 to the 1980s. Interestingly, labor’s share in Spain fluctuated for a while in the 1990s 
and then started a downward trend. The PWT6.2 shows that Spain achieved a real GDP per capita level 
of US$15,000 in 1990. Therefore, the Spanish case is very consistent with my new panel econometric 
findings.
Spain’s industrial sector was relatively stable at about 30 percent of GDP from 1955 to 1987; since 
then, it has dropped to about 20 percent, ending in 2005. Spain in 1959 had a relatively smaller services 
sector at 35 percent of the economy, whilst the United States in 1958 had already developed a services 
sector as large as 54 percent of the GDP. The share of the Spanish services sector has risen to 59 percent in 
2005, which is comparable to the United States in the mid-1980s.
3.4 the third (ongoing) transformation: financialization and the recent rise of the finance 
and real Estate sectors in developed countries
Many researchers have recognized the recent changes in labor’s share in the OECD countries, e.g., 
Blanchard (1997,1998), Caballero and Hammour (1998), Rodrik (1999), Acemoglu (2002, 2003), 
Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003), and Bentolila and Saint-Paul (2003). They have examined a variety 
of potential contributors behind this, including nominal macro factors, institutional differences, labor 
markets, biased technical change, and monopoly.
I exploit the new EU KLEMS database to take a close look at the sectoral evolvement for the OECD 
countries (the industrial classification in the EU KLEMS is close to ISIC rev. 3). To mitigate short-term 
fluctuations, I compare the five-year average of 1975–79 period (denoted as 1975 for simplicity) with 
the 2000–2004 (simply put as 2000). I then average the 16 OECD countries that have data available for 
1975–79. Table 4 shows a detailed decomposition of the main sectors.
I separate the services sector into financial services and nonfinancial services because these two 
subsectors have behaved very differently. Column (1) shows the changes in the aggregate labor’s share. I 12
can see a 3.3 percent average reduction from 1975 to 2000. 
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year 1975 and 2000 respectively. The further decomposition of the sectoral effects into 
) 4 ( ), 3 ( ), 2 ( ), 1 (   follows the definitions in section 3.1. The sum of  ) 4 ( ), 3 ( ), 1 ( , as shown in the 
bottom row, illustrates the sectoral contribution to the change in labor’s share between 1975 and 
2000. Although agriculture has the lowest labor’s share, its relative size in the economy is very 
small (5.9 percent in 1975 and down to 2.2 percent in 2000). Labor’s share in the financial 
services sector is around 35 to 38 percent, which is more than 30 percent lower than the industry 
and the nonfinance services. 
  From table 4, I can see agriculture in these developed countries has had a positive 
 and 
keep increasing in this process. 
  Ruiz (2005) presents a detailed analysis for both Spain and the United States from 1955 
to 2005 regarding their sectoral value-added size, within-sector labor’s share, and aggregate 
labor’s share in the national economy. Figure 10 illustrates the evolution of the labor’s share 
relative to GDP per capita for Spain. In 1955, real GDP per capita in Spain was higher than 
US$4,000, past my first turning point of US$3,000 derived in section 2. So I think Spain from 
1955 to 2005 is a good example to showcase the later stage of industrialization as well as 
deindustrialization. The Spanish aggregate labor’s share has kept increasing from 1955 to the 
1980s. Interestingly, labor’s share in Spain fluctuated for a while in the 1990s and then started a 
downward trend. The PWT6.2 shows that Spain achieved a real GDP per capita level of 
US$15,000 in 1990. Therefore, the Spanish case is very consistent with my new panel 
econometric findings. 
  Spain’s industrial sector was relatively stable at about 30 percent of GDP from 1955 to 
1987; since then, it has dropped to about 20 percent, ending in 2005. Spain in 1959 had a 
relatively smaller services sector at 35 percent of the economy, whilst the United States in 1958 
had already developed a services sector as large as 54 percent of the GDP. The share of the 
Spanish services sector has risen to 59 percent in 2005, which is comparable to the United States 
in the mid-1980s. 
3.4 The Third (Ongoing) Transformation: Financialization and the Recent Rise of the 
Finance and Real Estate Sectors in Developed Countries 
Many researchers have recognized the recent changes in labor’s share in the OECD countries, 
e.g., Blanchard (1997,1998), Caballero and Hammour (1998), Rodrik (1999), Acemoglu (2002, 
2003), Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003), and Bentolila and Saint-Paul (2003). They have 
examined a variety of potential contributors behind this, including nominal macro factors, 
institutional differences, labor markets, biased technical change, and monopoly. 
  I exploit the new EU KLEMS database to take a close look at the sectoral evolvement for 
the OECD countries (the industrial classification in the EU KLEMS is close to ISIC rev. 3). To 
mitigate short-term fluctuations, I compare the five-year average of 1975–79 period (denoted as 
1975 for simplicity) with the 2000–2004 (simply put as 2000). I then average the 16 OECD 
countries that have data available for 1975–79. Table 4 shows a detailed decomposition of the 
main sectors. 
  I separate the services sector into financial services and nonfinancial services because 
these two subsectors have behaved very differently. Column (1) shows the changes in the 
aggregate labor’s share. I can see a 3.3 percent average reduction from 1975 to 2000.  1975 , i l

  and 
2000 , i l

  represent the deviation of the sectoral labor’s share from the aggregate labor’s share in 
year 1975 and 2000 respectively. The further decomposition of the sectoral effects into 
) 4 ( ), 3 ( ), 2 ( ), 1 (   follows the definitions in section 3.1. The sum of  ) 4 ( ), 3 ( ), 1 ( , as shown in the 
bottom row, illustrates the sectoral contribution to the change in labor’s share between 1975 and 
2000. Although agriculture has the lowest labor’s share, its relative size in the economy is very 
small (5.9 percent in 1975 and down to 2.2 percent in 2000). Labor’s share in the financial 
services sector is around 35 to 38 percent, which is more than 30 percent lower than the industry 
and the nonfinance services. 
  From table 4, I can see agriculture in these developed countries has had a positive 
 represent the deviation 
of the sectoral labor’s share from the aggregate labor’s share in year 1975 and 2000 respectively. The 
further decomposition of the sectoral effects into (1), (2), (3), (4) follows the definitions in section 3.1. 
The sum of (1), (3), (4), as shown in the bottom row, illustrates the sectoral contribution to the change 
in labor’s share between 1975 and 2000. Although agriculture has the lowest labor’s share, its relative 
size in the economy is very small (5.9 percent in 1975 and down to 2.2 percent in 2000). Labor’s share 
in the financial services sector is around 35 to 38 percent, which is more than 30 percent lower than the 
industry and the nonfinance services.
From table 4, I can see agriculture in these developed countries has had a positive contribution 
to the change of aggregate labor’s share. Industry reduced the aggregate labor’s share by 2.6 percent. 
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    by -2.44 percent. That is, the financial sector 
lessened the aggregate labor’s share mainly due to its relative size expansion in the economy. I 
can see from the row     2000 - 1975 , the value-added share of the financial services sector 
gained in more than 10 percent from the total economy mainly at the expense of the industry 
(–8.9 percent). Interestingly, the contributors in these two sectors are disparate: For industry, it is 
through within-sector change of labor intensity; for the financial sector, it is due to the relative 
increase of the value-added share in the economy. 
  To understand movements within the financial services, I decompose it further and show 
the subindustry statistics in table 5. 
  Real estate activities (corresponding to the ISIC rev. 3 industrial code 70) have an 
extremely low value in terms of labor’s share (6 percent). Moreover, the real estate sector is 
found to be the main cause of labor’s share drop within the financial services (–1.84 percent). 
Once again, the expansion of the size of the real estate sector is the dominant factor that 
contributes to the drop in labor’s share, i.e.,  ) 4 ( t i i l v ,

    by (–1.75 percent). 
  In sum, sectoral analysis in this section generally confirms my previous findings and 
helps us to understand the disparate dynamics behind these three types of grand economic 
transformations at different development stages. 
4 EVIDENCE FROM THE ECONOMIC HISTORY 
Modern growth theory is largely built upon the empirical facts of the United Kingdom and the 
United States since the beginning of the 20th century. Most of the recent revisits of the problem 
on labor’s share only cover OECD countries after WWII. The earliest GDP data available in the 
PWT is in 1950, when the United States had reached a per capita GDP level of US$11,233 and 
the United Kingdom arrived at US$8,081. The economic development level of both the United 
States and United Kingdom has been well above the first turning point of US$3,000. No wonder 
the relative constancy of labor’s share has been observed by many prominent researchers. In this 
section, I will try to make use of the evidence in the economic history to examine whether my 
new empirical findings are equally applicable to these developed countries in an early stage of 
development. 
4.1 The United Kingdom, 1500–2004 
The first industrial revolution in human history originated in the United Kingdom in the later part 
of the 18th century. As Landes (1969) summarizes, “… In the eighteenth century, a series of 
inventions transformed the manufacture of cotton in England and gave rise to a new mode or 
production—the factory system … These improvements constitute the Industrial Revolution.” 
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observed by many prominent researchers. In this section, I will try to make use of the evidence in the 
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4.1 the united Kingdom, 1500–2004
The first industrial revolution in human history originated in the United Kingdom in the later part of the 
18th century. As Landes (1969) summarizes, “… In the eighteenth century, a series of inventions trans-
formed the manufacture of cotton in England and gave rise to a new mode or production—the factory 
system … These improvements constitute the Industrial Revolution.”
Lindert and Williamson (1983) conducted the first rigorous economic analysis of the English 
worker’s living standards during the Industrial Revolution. Their new evidence endorsed an optimistic 
view of a rapid rise of the workers’ real wages. Recently economic historians have discovered new evidence 
supporting the viewpoint of real average wage stagnation relative to the output during the industrial 
revolution of the United Kingdom. Feinstein (1998) estimates that over about 80 years from 1770 to 
1850, the increase in real earnings was less than 30 percent (his estimates were at 10 to 15 percent). Figure 
11 (from Allen 2007) demonstrates an obvious lag between the real wage growth and output growth: The 
real wage index rose by only 12 percent between 1780 and 1840, while the output per worker rose by 46 
percent.
Allen (2007) also discusses the long-term evolution of the functional distribution of the British 
national income for the same period. As demonstrated by the dotted line in figure 12, the labor’s share 
dropped from above 60 percent at the end of the 18th century to below 50 percent in the middle of the 
19th century, whereas the profit’s share increased from 20 percent to nearly 50 percent. “Engels’s pause” 
happened here, that is, the real wage lagged behind the rapid growth of output per worker. However, this 
“pause” changed dramatically from 1840 to 1900, during which the real wage increased by 123 percent 
and output per worker went up by only 90 percent.
The U-Shape pattern in the movements of labor’s share during the British Industrial Revolution 
is consistent with my panel regression findings using modern-time data for a large number of countries 14
at various development levels. The United Kingdom transformed from a premodern agricultural 
society to an industrialized economy starting in the late 18th century in a similar way that many newly 
industrialized economies (NIEs) and developing countries have experienced about 200 years later, though 
it might have taken the United Kingdom a longer time to finish. According to Allen (2000), the share of 
labor force in UK agriculture went down from more than 70 percent in 1500 via 55 percent in 1700 to 
35 percent in 1800. In 1850, agriculture of the United Kingdom employed one-quarter of the labor force 
(Clark and Werf 1998).
Economic historians have debated for a long time about the timing of agricultural revolution in 
the United Kingdom as well as its relationship with the Industrial Revolution. The “revisionists” like 
Allen (1999) offer new evidence supporting an earlier occurrence of the agricultural revolution that can 
be dated back to the 1500s. They see the rise of agricultural productivity and output had facilitated the 
debouchment of the Industrial Revolution. In fact, this view echoes many prominent researchers in the 
growth and development literature, as by Jorgenson (1961, 1967), Matsuyama (1992), and most recently 
Gollin, Parente, and Rogerson (2002, 2007), who emphasize the importance of food problems and the 
essential effect of the agricultural revolution on releasing the much-needed resources to the juvenile 
modern economic sector. An up-to-date example is unquestionable impact of the green revolution on 
development. I will build a growth model in section 5 following this line of argument.
Most recently, according to the EU KLEMS database, the United Kingdom reached its peak 
of labor’s share in 1975 at 70 percent. Using five-year averages, its share decreased from 67 percent 
(1975–79) to 63 percent (2000–2004). During the same period, its financial sector remarkably increased 
from 13 percent of GDP to 30 percent. The labor’s share within the financial sector went down from 
51.7 percent to 46.9 percent, which is significantly lower than the aggregate labor’s share in the national 
economy.
In short, the full development process of the first industrial economy in human history presents a 
perfect example of the cubic relationship between the labor’s income and the average income level.
4.2 the united states, 1790–1900
Is the United States special? A brief answer is no. My major data sources are the US Census Bureau (1975) 
and Carter et al. (2006), which cover a wide range of economic time series dating back to the colonial 
times. I illustrate the historical evolution of the American labor’s income and per capita GDP level in 
figure 13. To make the long-run data series consistent, I use the wage share in the national income as a 
proxy of labor’s share.
In the beginning of these time series, the GDP per capita of the United States was at US$1,200 (in 
2000 constant US dollars) in 1790, and then gradually rose to US$3,000 (the supposed turning point) 15
toward the end of the 1870s. The US economy experienced a phenomenal industrialization during the 
second half of the 19th century. In 1860, more than 60 percent of the total labor force was still employed 
on farms, which were producing 35 percent of the total GDP, and the per capita GDP level was at 
US$2,300. My calculation shows that the ratio of all workers’ wages to the GDP was around  
70 percent then. Ten years later (in figure 13 I interpolate and connect 1860 and 1870 labor’s share 
points with a dotted line, due to the lack of data in between), this ratio went down to 60 percent ending 
in 1870. Labor’s share continued to decline to below 50 percent in 1880. From then on this downward 
trend was just reversed. In the next 10 years, from 1880 to the 1890s, the wage’s share in GDP gained  
10 percent, gradually returning to 60 percent. In 1900 the share of farms’ value added in GDP decreased 
to 20 percent. Since 1900, the wage’s share in GDP has been stabilized at around 65 percent (except for 
the period of the Great Depression), during which time the Kaldor Fact had been generally applicable.
Therefore, the United States was not very different from other countries in terms of the 
industrialization process, although the United States completed it in a faster pace than the United 
Kingdom and much earlier than most of the other countries. For the modern part of US economic 
development, a Solow growth model with a constant labor’s share of 65 percent could be a very good 
approximation of the real economy (good enough for modern economic analysis and forecast); however, 
when I need to seriously study the premodern and industrialization stages of the American economy, I 
probably cannot take the constancy of labor’s share for granted and might want to further scrutinize the 
historical data.
4.3 Japan, 1955–2000
Japan’s postwar economic development also defies the constancy of the labor’s share. I draw the Japanese 
labor’s share and real GDP per capita for the post WWII period in figure 14. In 1955, the labor’s share in 
the national income of Japan was as low as 44 percent, and its GDP per capita was at US$3,100, exactly 
surpassing the first turning point. In 40 years, Japan’s aggregate labor’s share had risen to 61 percent 
ending in 1998, according to the Japanese official sources. In addition, very comparable to other highly 
developed countries, the value-added share of Japan’s finance, insurance, real estate, and business services 
sector increased from 15 percent to 25 percent from the end of the 1970s to 2000.
4.4 summary
The generalized fact of the cubic form movements in labor’s share is not only applicable to nowadays 
developing countries: It seems to describe a universal story of economic transformations, no matter when 
it happened, be it the late 1700s in the United Kingdom, the second half of 19th century in the United 
States, the 1950s through the 1970s in Japan, the 1970s through the 1990s in Korea, or the present in 
China and India.16
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by absorbing the released labor from agriculture. My framework is purely neoclassical and assumes equal 
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5.4 dynamics of labor’s share
I will examine the evolution of labor’s share within these growth dynamics. The labor’s share in agriculture 
is calculated as (30),
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5.4 Dynamics of labor’s share 
I will examine the evolution of labor’s share within these growth dynamics. The labor’s share in 
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To make labor’s share constant, I must have (44),
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From (21), I can see that the employment share in the agricultural and modern sectors is only 
determined by the technology growth rate in agriculture, with the neoclassical assumption. Labor’s share 
will evolve in different patterns under the following two conditions:








m t l k labor’s share will increase from t 








m t l k labor’s share will decrease from t 
The intuition behind these dynamics is, if the agriculture releases more labor than the modern sector 
can easily absorb, the wage rate will be brought down relatively. In the beginning of modern economic 
take-off, capital is comparatively rare, thus demanding higher return. However, k will keep growing 
and finally labor turns out to be the relatively scarce factor. This will reverse the downward trend in the 
movements of labor’s share in the economy.
5.5 A simple simulation
In this section, I conduct a simple calibration and simulation for the above-discussed growth model. 
As an important example, I try to test whether a nonmonotonous pattern of movement in labor’s share 
could really emerge from my proposed model during the British Industrial Revolution. My model-based 
simulation tracks quite well with the empirical evidence provided by Allen (2007). The proposed multi-
sector CES growth model is helpful for understanding the nonlinearity in the movements of labor’s share 
during economic transformations. The details of simulation will be provided later.
6 conclusIons
In this paper I present a new set of evidence to characterize the long-run evolvement of labor’s share 
accompanying the modern economic development. The movements of labor’s share demonstrate a 
nonlinear and nonmonotonous pattern after the debut of the modern economic sector. I summarize this 
as a generalized fact that labor’s share tracks a cubic relationship with the economic development level, due 
to the grand economic transformations. I have further explored the evidences from economic history and 
confirmed this generalized relationship is also applicable to the earlier development stage of the United 
Kingdom and the United States, whose contemporary economic time series (summarized by the Kaldor 
fact) inspired the standard modern growth theory. The Kaldor fact however can be seen as a special case 
focusing on the relatively stable portion upon the long cubic curve. The mainstream Cobb-Douglas class 
growth models are not able to capture the nonmonotonous pattern in the labor’s share movements, while 
my proposed two-sector CES-form model is qualified for explaining this dynamics. Calibration and 
simulation based on the proposed growth model fit the historical facts fairly well.23
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table A1     labor’s share and real gdP per capita, 1950–2003






































































Observations  2037 2037 463 463 463 463
R2 0.100 0.063* 0.087 0.064 0.062 0.089
# Countries 101 101 101 101 101 101
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. The removed commodity exporters: BHR BRN QAT TTO ARE OMN GAB SAU 
DZA KAZ NGA YEM MNG VEN IRN ZMB CHL NOR AZE MOZ BOL RUS CIV BLR.
Source: Author’s calculations.27
table A2     labor’s share and development with standard controls, 1950–2003
  five-year panels with country and time fE, commodity exporters removed






































































































Observations   388 388 368 368 351
R2  0.118 0.132 0.151 0.152 0.257
# Countries  81 81 78 78 74
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. The removed commodity exporters are the same as in table A1.
Source: Author’s calculations.28
table 1     correlation between the operating surplus of 






















*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Source: Author’s calculations.





































































Observations  2406 2406 552 552 552 552
R2  0.088 0.056 0.087 0.066 0.062 0.089
# Countries  123 123 123 123 123 123
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Source: Author’s calculations.29
table 3     labor’s share and development with standard controls, 1950–2003
five-year panels with country and time fixed effects
variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1n(rgdpch)
–351.8*** –357.4**** –439.6**** –439.3*** –746.7*****
(87.53)* (87.13)** (91.48)** (91.71)* (115.6)*****
[1n(rgdpch)]2 40.92*** 41.56*** 51.63*** 51.59*** 85.12****
(10.33)** (10.28)** (10.82)** (10.84)** (13.28)***
[1n(rgdpch)]3 –1.567*** –1.594*** –1.996*** –1.994*** –3.208***
(0.403)** (0.401)** (0.423)** (0.424)** (0.506)**
1n(School Year) 
–3.722** –5.007*** –4.682** –4.633** –6.353***
(1.750)* (1.845)** (1.911)* (2.034)* (2.773)**
[1n(School Year)]2 1.633** 1.233** 1.229* 1.837***
(0.775)* (0.808)* (0.812) (1.010)**
Investment
0.134** 0.144* 0.128** 0.127* 0.0802**
(0.0750) (0.0748) (0.0773) (0.0781) (0.0763)*
Population growth
0.0619 0.357** 0.520** 0.514* 0.0305**











1042*** 1057*** 1276*** 1275*** 2214***
(245.9)*** (244.8)*** (256.1)*** (256.8)*** (334.6)***
Observations 440 440 420 420 402
R2 0.107 0.119 0.135 0.135 0.221
# Countries 92 92 89 89 85
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Source:  Author’s calculations.30
figure 1     labor’s share and real gdP per capita
Source: Author’s calculations.31










(g, h, I, l–Q)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
lshare vA lshare vA lshare vA lshare vA
1975–1979 Avg 58.9 18.10 5.9 64.0 36.3 35.60 16.2 69.6 41.5
2000–2004 Avg 55.6 23.80 2.2 56.0 27.4 38.60 26.7 67.6 43.6
D [1975–2000] –3.3 5.70 –3.7 –8.0 –8.9 3.00 10.5 –2.1 2.1
li , 1975 –40.74 5.12 –23.26 10.75
li , 2000 –31.75 0.43 –17.00 11.98
(1) vi , t . Dli –2.9 0.34 –2.90 0.48 –0.86
(2) vi , t . li , t 0.1 –2.41 1.86 –3.77 4.47
(3) Dvi . Dli 0.8 –0.21 0.71 0.31 –0.04
(4) Dvi . li , t –1.2 1.51 –0.46 –2.44 0.23
(1) + (3) + (4) –3.3 1.64 –2.64 –1.65 –0.67
Notes: Lshare denotes labor’s share (percent); VA: the share of sectoral value-added in GDP (percent). Letters in brackets following sector names correspond 
to the industrial code of ISIC rev. 3.
Source: EU KLEMS database. 
table 5     decomposing changes within the financial sector, oEcd: 1975–2000
financial
intermediation (J)
real estate, renting and
business activities (K)
real estate
(IsIc rev. 3: 70)
(1) (2) (3)
lshare vA lshare vA lshare vA
1975–1979 Avg 56.6 5.1 27.2 11.2 6.9 6.6
2000–2004 Avg 54 6.7 34.2 20.1 6.1 9.9
D [1975–2000] –2.7 1.6 7 8.9 –0.8 3.4
li , 1975 –2.23 –31.71 –52.00
li , 2000 –1.61 –21.38 –49.54
(1) vi , t . Dli –0.13 0.79 –0.05
(2) vi , t . li , t –0.11 –3.54 –3.41
(3) Dvi . Dli –0.04 0.63 –0.03
(4) Dvi . li , t –0.04 –2.82 –1.75
(1) + (3) + (4) –0.21 –1.41 –1.84
Note: Column (3), the real estate sector (ISIC rev. 3: 70) is a subsector of column (2) (ISIC rev. 3: K). 
Source: EU KLEMS database. 32
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figure 4     cross-country comparison of the labor’s share, 1980–84 average
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figure 5     cross-country comparison of the labor’s share, 1990–94 average
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figure 6     cross-country comparison of the labor’s share, 2000–2004 average
Source: Author’s calculations.
figure 7     labor’s share of china, 1978–2004
Note: Data of Labor’s Share from Bai and Qian (2009); Real GDP from PWT6.235
figure 8     wage share in organized Indian manufacturing, 1973–97
Source: Shastri and Murthy (2006).
figure 9     labor’s share of India, 1980–2007
Note: Labor’s Share from National Sources; Real GDP from PWT6.236
figure 10     labor’s share of spain, 1955–2005
Source: Data of Labor’s Share from Ruiz (2005); Real GDP from PWT6.2
figure 11     british wage and gdP since the Industrial revolution
Source:  Allen 2007. 37
figure 12     historical factor shares, the united Kingdom: 1770–1913
Source:  Allen 2007. 
figure 13     labor’s share of the united states, 1850–2000
Note: Data from Historical Statistics of the United States38
figure 14     labor’s share of Japan, 1955–2003
Source: Labor’s Share from Official Sources; Real GDP from PWT6.2